Privacy And Its Effect On Society Essay - 1627 Words

Privacy can be defined as â€Å"the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others. It is our right to keep information about ourselves or even things important to us from the public. Privacy allows one to express themselves without the lingering eyes and judgement of the public at large. However, privacy as we know it has degraded much with the evolution of technology in our present-day culture. Its slowly being invaded and lost altogether with many arguing it is for the greater good of everyone. There is much to the discussion of privacy which can be traced back hundreds of years, and directly correlates with the improvement and invention of technology. As it stands today technology has evolved to the point of complete transparency in anyone’s life. The debate over this being a positive or a complete violation of our rights can be quite controversial. This is only made more so with the domestic and global issues that feed fuel to the fire. However, there are steps to protect yourselves and movements that aim to defend and safeguard your privacy in the works already. II. PRIVACY THEN AND NOW Although issues on privacy are thought to be much more recent in years the truth is that the discussion about privacy in the western world started with the introduction of the newspaper printing press and photography. The debate on privacy can be traced back to as far as 1890 in an article written byShow MoreRelatedPrivacy And Its Effect On Society1030 Words   |  5 PagesEveryone is entitled to a certain level of privacy in regards to their personal information. However, there is the constant increase and enhancement in technology and the growing value of information for use in decision making. Between these two facts, the definition of privacy becomes unclear and allows people to gather information that one might deem confidential. Privacy has been manipulated in efforts claiming that as long as it is beneficial in the long run to a wholesome amount of people thenRead MoreAn Invasion Of Privacy And Its Effects On Society1804 Words   |  8 PagesI. Introduction of the problem or topic: a. An invasion of privacy is when something inaccessible to the public is intruded upon or exposed without one’s permission. Privacy is the ability for one to select and control information revealed about themselves. b. Introduce the problem or topic i. The government constantly collects personal data from citizens without their permission. ii. The information collected should be limited and only obtained after notifying the person that is being examinedRead MoreWhy Privacy Matters So If You Have Nothing?935 Words   |  4 PagesIn support of privacy, Daniel J. Solove wrote, Why Privacy Matters Even If You Have ‘Nothing to Hide.’ Solove begins his argument by introducing the nothing-to-hide argument. In general, the argument for surveillance is ‘if you’ve got nothing to hide, you’ve got nothing to fear:’ hence people’s support for government efforts and regulations to ‘protect’ citizens by decreasing privacy. Those who object this argument target its most extreme cases. For example, if you have nothing to hide, could I takeRead MorePrivacy, Surveillance, And Law Essay1684 Words   |  7 Pagesexpected to trust the government, companies, and each other. Although scholars have provided several accounts of the importance of privacy, it still remains unclear how individuals view and value it. For the purposes of this essay, privacy is broadly defined as the controlled access to personal information or ideas. In this paper, I will examine Richard Posner’s article â€Å"Privacy, Surveillance, and Law† and Neil Richards’s paper â€Å"The Dangers of Surveillance.† Although both Posner and Richards begin withRead MoreThe Positive And Negative Effects Of Privacy And Social Media1518 Words   |  7 PagesThe Oxford dictionary defines Privacy as the state or condition of being free from being observed or disturbed by other people (2017). It should not come as a surprise that websites designed to share pictures, ideas, and what is for dinner, leave individuals feeling that their privacy has been invaded. It is also not surprising that some people are oblivious to the effects of what they post online. It is safe to say the loss of privacy can be self-imposed for societies need to collaborate and socializedRead MoreAnalys is Of George Orwell s 1984848 Words   |  4 Pages Critical Analysis In the George Orwell’s novel 1984, much of the society is watched and have no privacy of any kind. Every person in the Party is under surveillance. In effect, these people cannot live freely and independently, but it seems to be an impossible task because of of the Party surveillance, and how they limit thinking and manipulate reality. We can similarly see these concerns and their effects in today s society and the ways the novel also acts as a warning for the future. In 1984Read MoreThe Invasion Of Privacy And Concern For Safety1624 Words   |  7 PagesIntroduction: The invasion of privacy and concern for safety has been an increasing worry among people who live in the United States and across the world. The main issue is how does the government’s actions change how people view their own security and even national security. Broader theories of this research question would be how the government’s interaction with technology and security influence how people think about their own personal privacy and safety as well as our national security. SomeRead MorePrivacy Rights : Moral And Legal Foundations1312 Words   |  6 Pagesmorals play in shaping privacy rights and/or expectations? It is understood that there are a number of definitions of privacy. Intellectuals have published works with varying content throughout the years. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis’ article gathered that privacy is the â€Å"right to be let alone† (Samuel Warren). Additionally, William Parent suggested that â€Å"privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others† (Moore, Privacy Rights: Moral and LegalRead MoreThe Right Of Privacy Assignment1224 Words   |  5 PagesRight of Privacy Assignment Brian Taylor – GEICO BUS 220 Dictionary.com provides a definition of individual privacy which reads; â€Å"Freedom from damaging publicity, public scrutiny, secret surveillance, or unauthorized disclosure of one s personal data or information, as by a government, corporation, or individual†. On a basic level, the right of individual privacy simply means that one has the right to be left alone. This is a right many in our society claim to hold as inalienable, yet in ourRead MorePrivacy Rights : Moral And Legal Foundations1584 Words   |  7 Pagesnumber of definitions of privacy. Intellectuals have published works with varying content throughout the years. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis’ article gathered that privacy is the â€Å"right to be let alone† (Samuel Warren). Additionally, William Parent suggested that â€Å"privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others† (Moore, Privacy Rights: Moral and Legal Foundations). On the oth er hand, Julie Inness illustrated that privacy is â€Å"the state of possessing

What is Happening to Reading - 641 Words

Reading is very important, so important in fact that technology has advanced to the point where we can keep an entire library in our pocket. Readers have always been a very small population according to Bellow. Technology has advanced to the point where it is possible to log on to the internet, click on a book and download it and be able to read immediately. This is a very important advancement to the reading community as it allows them to have it readily accessible. Technology is only improving the ability and availability for people to read. â€Å"For Americans under the age of 30, film has replaced the novel as the dominant mode of artistic expression.† (Bellow 8). It may be true that many people prefer to watch a movie than read a book. But for the population that reads more than watching movies there is a huge market for authors to keep writing. Movies may also have an effect on getting people to read also. Over the years, many children’s books and teen bo oks have become movies. Even books have been remade into movies time and time again. They may vary in quality, but the original books stay the same which keeps the booklovers coming back to the books. The future of books may also be dwindling with the availability of technology. The ease of access to online books and texts may eventually make physical books obsolete. But there will always be the small handful of people that love to have that physical book. Some people even collect books, maybe not toShow MoreRelated Story Truth Vs. Happening Truth Using Tim Obriens work Essay642 Words   |  3 Pagesof Story Truth vs. Happening Truth Literature is such a beautiful thing because it does not give us an answer to its questions. There are so many iffy spots that leave us to develop our own thoughts and feelings toward the piece of work. This is an interesting factor because at many times it affects us in a different way and can develop us as an individual. When reading a piece of literature, one person can interpret it in different ways than another person reading the same piece of workRead MoreThe Banning of Certain Books in School Libraries/ Classrooms848 Words   |  4 Pagesjust fictional books. Those books are all about censorship and having the government controlling and watching your every move. What most people dont realize is that there is censorship happening right now, every time you send a text or make a phone call, the government can see/hear it. There is censorship on books at schools and ratings on movies. There is censorship happening all around you and most of us dont even notice it. Thats because t hey are minor, but, over time things can progressively getRead MoreMy Experience Of Youtube Videos1139 Words   |  5 Pagesmostly makeup beauty hacks, and I don’t wear makeup. But I wanted to see what it would be like if someone who was Deaf wanted to learn beauty hacks. It was pretty hard to pay attention to what she was doing because I was too focused on reading all the captions. She also talked kind of fast so I couldn’t read all of it and see what she was doing. I paused it a few times so I could look at what she doing and not have to focus on reading. I then went to a video from Buzzfeed, something that I would normallyRead MoreShort Story Analysis1076 Words   |  5 PagesUnease. Thrilling. Surprise. These are simply three feelings thrown at the reader all happening in a one-page story. Short-short stories often have the affect of making the reader feel uneasy. The reason behind this, is because the stories are so short the writer needs to jump directly into the story with something interesting or alarming to grab the reader’s attention. Often, the more uneasy the writing is, the more it leaves an effect on the reader. Clearly, some stories are more uneasy thanRead MoreLiterary Theory : The Postcolonial Theory880 Words   |  4 Pagescolonization that was happening. For example when reading about colonization in American we only read from writing from men who are white and upper/middle class. Literature could be oppressive because it was only written from one point of view back when colonization was happening. Cultural studies theory looks at different cultures and how they are viewed, this theory does not allow us to make assumptions. As individuals we are not allowed to make assumption about writing and what culture has betterRead MoreAnalysis Of An Occurrence At Owl Creek Bridge814 Words   |  4 Pagesthose included â€Å"An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge† by Ambrose Bierce and â€Å"The Raven† by Edgar Allen Poe. 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I researched many different types of articles which helped give me a better perspective onRead MoreBook Review Of Biology883 Words   |  4 Pagestrying to comprehend what I was reading, even after reading it over and over. It wasn’t easy and I still don’t know if I fully understand what I have read. The first thing that caught my attention with these chapters is the concept of time! The book says that â€Å"each day of Earths â€Å"year† would represent 12 million years of actual history.† This blows my mind because I never would have thought of it like this, but in a way, it makes sense. It also proves that evolution is happening faster than we canRead MoreThe Book Dust Lands 1015 Words   |  5 Pages I have been reading a book series called Dust Lands. The first book is called Blood Red Road, and the second book I have just finished is called Rebel Heart, both are written by the infamous Moira Young. I must say that I absolutely adored both books. Especially Rebel Heart. It may have positively confused me and left me feeling sick to my stomach at points, but it was phenomenal! I would totally read it again, in fact, I wish I owned it so that I could read it again. Only after I’ve read the thirdRead MoreThe Impact Of Internet On Our Lives985 Words   |  4 Pagesthan how long material is. This is mainly a problem when the person is looking for research, either in a book or online. So the person decides to use the internet to find what they are looking for because of the fact that it doesn’t take as much work. Then when the person finds something that is even a little bit related to what they are looking for, they stop, even if it isn’t the best article. Chri stine Rosen, the writer of People of the Screen, compared this process to the gold rush and more specifically

The Great Trade Collapse What Caused It and What Does It Mean Free Essays

The great trade collapse: What caused it and what does it mean? Richard Baldwin 27 November 2009 World trade experienced a sudden, severe, and synchronised collapse in late 2008 – the sharpest in recorded history and deepest since WWII. This ebook – written for the world’s trade ministers gathering for the WTO’s Trade Ministerial in Geneva – presents the economics profession’s received wisdom on the collapse. Two dozen chapters, written by leading economists from across the globe, summarise the latest research on the causes of the collapse as well as its consequences and the prospects for recovery. We will write a custom essay sample on The Great Trade Collapse: What Caused It and What Does It Mean or any similar topic only for you Order Now According to the emerging consensus, the collapse was caused by the sudden, severe and globally synchronised postponement of purchases, especially of durable consumer and investment goods (and their parts and components). The impact was amplified by â€Å"compositional† and â€Å"synchronicity† effects in which international supply chains played a central role. The â€Å"great trade collapse† occurred between the third quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009. Signs are that it has ended and recovery has begun, but it was huge – the steepest fall of world trade in recorded history and the deepest fall since the Great Depression. The drop was sudden, severe, and synchronised. A few facts justify the label: The Great Trade Collapse. It was severe and sudden Global trade has dropped before – three times since WWII – but this is by far the largest. As Figure 1 shows, global trade fell for at least three quarters during three of the worldwide recessions that have occurred since 1965 – the oil-shock recession of 1974-75, the inflation-defeating recession of 1982-83, and the Tech-Wreck recession of 2001-02. Specifically: †¢The 1982 and 2001 drops were comparatively mild, with growth from the previous year’s quarter reaching -5% at the most. †¢The 1970s event was twice that size, with growth stumbling to -11%. †¢Today collapse is much worse; for two quarters in a row, world trade flows have been 15% below their previous year levels. The OECD has monthly data on its members’ real trade for the past 533 months; the 7 biggest month-on-month drops among the 533 all occurred since November 2008 (see the chapter by Sonia Araujo and Joaquim Oliveira). Figure 1 The great trade collapses in historical perspective, 1965 – 2009 Source: OECD Quarterly real trade data. The great trade collapse is not as large as that of the Great Depression, but it is much steeper. It took 24 months in the Great Depression for world trade to fall as far as it fell in the 9 months from November 2008 (Figure 2). The latest data in the figure (still somewhat preliminary) suggests a recovery is underway. Figure 2 The great trade collapses vs. the Great Depression Source: Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009), based on CPB online data for latest. It was synchronised †¢All 104 nations on which the WTO reports data experienced a drop in both imports and exports during the second half of 2008 and the first half of 2009. †¢Figure 3 shows how imports and exports collapsed for the EU27 and 10 other nations that together account for three-quarters of world trade; each of these trade flows dropped by more than 20% from 2008Q2 to 2009Q2; many fell 30% or more. Figure 3 The great trade collapse, 2008 Q2 to 2009 Q2 Sources: WTO online database. Figure 4 shows that world trade in almost all product categories were positive in 2008Q2, almost all were negative in 2008Q4, and all where negative in 2009Q1. The categories most marked by international supply chains (Mechanical and electrical machinery, Precision instruments, and Vehicles) saw some of the biggest drops, and detailed empirics in the chapter by Bems, Johnson and Yi finds that supply chains were hit harder controlling for other factors. The chart, however, shows that the falls were by no means extraordinary large in these sectors. Figure 4 All types of goods trade collapsed simultaneously Source: Comtrade database. Manufactures and commodities Trade collapsed across the board, but it is important to distinguish between commodities and manufactures. The collapse in minerals and oil trade started from a boom time and fell faster than total trade (Figure 5). The reason was prices. Food, materials and especially oil experienced a steep run up in price in early 2008; the boom ended in mid 2008 – well before the September 2008 Lehman’s debacle. The price of manufactures, by contrast, was rather steady in this period (Figure 6). Figure 5 The great trade collapse and values: Food, oil, and manufactures Source: ITC online database. Since food, fuels, and raw materials make up about a quarter of global trade, these price movements had a big impact on aggregate trade figures. Countries dependent on commodity exports, in particular oil exporters, were among those that experienced the greatest drop in exports (see the chapters Africa by Peter Draper and Gilberto Biacuana, and by Leonce Ndikumana and Tonia Kandiero, and on India by Rajiv Kumar and Dony Alex). The drop in manufactures trade was also massive, but it involved mostly quantity reductions. Exporters specialising in durable goods manufactures saw a particularly sharp decline in their exports (see chapters on Japan by Ruyhei Wakasugi and by Kiyoyasu Tanaka). Mexico, which is both an oil exporter and a participant in the US’s manufacturing supply chain, experienced one of the world’s most severe trade slumps (see chapter by Ray Robertson). Figure 6 The great trade collapse and prices: Commodity vs. manufactures Source: CPB online database. Causes The great trade collapse was triggered by – and helped spread – the global economic slump that has come to be called â€Å"The Great Recession. 1 As the left panel of Figure 7 shows, the OECD nations slipped into recession in this period, with the largest importing markets – the US, EU and Japan (the G3) – seeing their GDP growth plummet more or less in synch. The US and Europe saw negative GDP growth rates of 3 to 4%; Japan was hit far worse. Figure 7 The current recession, OECD nations and G3, 2007Q1 – 2009Q2 Note: G3 is US, EU and Japan. Source: OECD online data base. Why did trade fall so much more than GDP? Given the global recession, a drop in global trade is unsurprising. The question is: Why was it so big? The chapter by Caroline Freund shows that during the four large, postwar recessions (1975, 1982, 1991, and 2001) world trade dropped 4. 8 times more than GDP (also see Freund 2009). This time the drop was far, far larger. From a historical perspective (Figure 8), the drop is astonishing. The figure shows the trade-to-GDP ratio rising steeply in the late 1990s, before stagnating in the new century right up to the great trade collapse in 2008. The rise in the 1990s is explained by a number of factors including trade liberalisation. A key driver, however, was the establishment of international supply chains (manufacturing was geographically unbundled with various slices of the value-added process being placed in nearby nations). This unbundling meant that the same value-added crossed borders several times. In a simple international supply chain, imported parts would be transformed into exported components which were in turn assembled into final goods and exported again, so the trade figures counted the final value added several times. As we shall see, the presences of these highly integrated and tightly synchronised production networks plays an important role in the nature of the great trade collapse (see chapters by Rudolfs Bems, Robert Johnson, and Kei-Mu Yi, and by Andrei Levchenko, Logan Lewis, and Linda Tesar). Figure 8 World trade to world GDP ratio, 1980Q1 to 2009Q2 Source: World imports from OECD online data base; World GDP based on IMF data. Emerging consensus on the causes Economists around the world have been working hard to understand the causes of this unusually large and abrupt shut down of international trade. The dozen chapters in Part II of this book summarise all the key research – most of it done by the authors themselves. They do not all agree on all points, but a consensus is emerging. When sales drop sharply – and the great trade collapse was a gigantic drop in international sales – economists look for demand shocks and/or supply shocks. The emerging consensus is that the great trade collapse was mostly a demand shock – although supply side factors played some role. The demand shock operated through two distinct but mutually reinforcing channels: †¢Commodity prices – which tumbled when the rice bubble burst in mid 2008 – continued to follow world demand in its downward spiral. The price movements and diminished demand sent the value and volume of commodities trade diving. †¢The production and exports of manufacturing collapsed as the Lehman’s-induced shock-and-awe caused consumers and firms to wait and see; private demand fo r all manner of ‘postpone-able’ consumption crashed. This second point was greatly amplified by the very particular nature of the demand shock that hit the world’s economy in September 2008. Why so big? This consensus view, however, is incomplete. It raises the question: If the trade drop was demand driven, why was the trade drop so much larger than the GDP drop? The answer provided by the emerging consensus is that the nature of the demand shock interacted with â€Å"compositional† and â€Å"synchronicity† effects to greatly exaggerate the movement of the trade-to-GDP ratio. Compositional effect The compositional effect turns on the peculiar nature of the demand shock. The demand shock was very large, but also focused on a narrow range of domestic value-added activities – the production of â€Å"postponeable† goods, consumer durables and investment goods. This demand drop immediately, reducing demand for all related intermediate inputs (parts and components, chemicals, steel, etc). The compositional-effect argument is founded on the fact that postponeables make up a narrow slice of world GDP, but a very large slice of the world trade (Figure 9). In a nutshell, the common cause of the GDP and trade collapse – a sudden drop in the demand for postponeables – operated with full force on trade but diminished force on GDP due to the compositional difference. The large demand shock applied to the near-totality of trade while only applying to a thin portion of GDP. Here is a simple example. 2 Suppose exports consisted of 90% â€Å"postponeable† (consumer and investment electronics, transport equipment, machinery and their parts and components). GDP, however, consists most of non-tradeables (services, etc). Taking postponeables’ share in US GDP to be 20%, the pre-crisis situation is: When the sales of postponeables slumps by, say, half, the numerator falls much more than the denominator. Assuming that †other† continues growth in trade and GDP by 2%, the post-crisis trade to GDP ratio is Exports have fallen 44. 8% in this example, while GDP has fallen only 8. 4%. In short, the different composition of trade and GDP, taken together with the specific nature of the demand shock, has resulted in trade falling more than 5 times as fast as GDP. See the chapter by Andrei Levchenko, Logan Lewis, and Linda Tesar for a careful investigation of this logic using detailed US production and trade data; they find that the compositional effect accounts for most of the US trade drop. The chapter by Joseph Francois and Julia Woerz uses US and Chinese data to argue that the compositional effect is key to understanding the trade collapse. 3 Figure 9 Composition of world goods trade Source: WTO online database for 2007. Synchronicity effect The synchronicity effect helps explain why the great trade collapse was so great in an even more direct manner; almost every nation’s imports and exports fell at the same time. There was none of the averaging out that occurred in the three other postwar trade drops. But why was it so synchronised? There are two leading explanations for the remarkable synchronicity. The first concerns international supply chains, the second concerns the ultimate cause of the Great Recession. The profound internationalisation of the supply chain that has occurred since the 1980s – specifically, the just-in-time nature of these vertically integrated production networks – served to coordinate, i. e. rapidly transmit, demand shocks. Even a decade ago, a drop in consumer sales in the US or Europe took months to be transmitted back to the factories and even longer to reach the suppliers of those factories. Today, Factory Asia is online. Hesitation by US and European consumers is transmitted almost instantly to the entire supply chain, which reacts almost instantly by producing and buying less; trade drops in synch, both imports and exports. For example, during the 2001 trade collapse, monthly data for 52 nations shows that 39% of the month-nation pairs had negative growth for both imports and exports. In the 2008 crisis the figure is 83%. For details on this point, see Di Giovanni, Julian and Andrei Levchenko (2009), Yi (2009), and the chapters by Rudolfs Bems, Robert Johnson, and Kei-Mu Yi, and by Kiyoyasu Tanaka. The second explanation requires a bit of background and a bit of conjecture (macroeconomists have not arrived at a consensus on the causes of the Great Recession). To understand the global shock to the demand for traded goods, we need a thumbnail sketch of the global crisis. How the subprime crisis became the global crisis The â€Å"Subprime Crisis† broke out in August 2007. For 13 months, the world viewed this as a financial crisis that was mainly restricted to the G7 nations who had mismanaged their monetary and regulatory policy – especially the US and the UK. Figure 3 shows that world trade continued growing apace in 2007 and early 2008. The crisis metastasised from the â€Å"Subprime Crisis† to the global crisis in September 2008. The defining moment came when the US Treasury allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt. This shocked the global financial community since they had assumed no major financial institution would be allowed to go under. Many of the remaining financial institutions were essentially bankrupt in an accounting sense, so no one knew who might be next. Bankers stopped lending to each other and credit markets froze. The Lehman bankruptcy, however, was just one of a half dozen â€Å"impossible events† that occurred at this time. Here is a short list of others:4 †¢All big investment banks disappeared. †¢The US Fed lent $85 billion to an insurance company (AIG), borrowing money from the US Treasury to cover the loan. †¢A US money market fund lost so much that it could not repay its depositors capital. †¢US Treasury Secretary Paulson asked the US Congress for three-quarters of a trillion dollars based on a 3-page proposal; he had difficulties in answering direct questions about how the money would fix the problem. The hereto laissez-faire US Securities and Exchange Commission banned short selling of bank stocks to slow the drop in financial institutions stock prices. It didn’t work. †¢Daniel Gros and Stephano Micossi (2009) pointed out that European banks were too big to fail and too big to save (their assets were often multiples of the their home nationsâ€⠄¢ GDPs); †¢Congress said â€Å"no† to Paulson’s ill-explained plan, promising its own version. As people around the world watched this unsteady and ill-explained behaviour of the US government, a massive feeling of insecurity formed. Extensive research in behavioural economics shows that people tend to act in extremely risk averse ways when gripped by fears of the unknown (as opposed to when they are faced with risk, as in a game of cards, where all outcomes can be enumerated and assigned a probability). Fall 2008 was a time when people really had no idea what might happen. This is Ricardo Caballero’s hypothesis of â€Å"Knightian Uncertainty† (i. e. the fear of the unknown) which has been endorsed by the IMF’s chief economist Olivier Blanchard. Consumers, firms, and investors around the world decided to â€Å"wait and see† – to hold off on postponeable purchases and investments until they could determine how bad things would get. The delaying of purchases and investments, the redressing of balance sheets and the switching of wealth to the safest assets caused what Caballero has called â€Å"sudden financial arrest† (a conscious reference to the usually fatal medical cond ition â€Å"sudden cardiac arrest†). The â€Å"fear factor† spread across the globe at internet speed. Consumers, firms and investors all feared that they’d find out what capitalism without the capital would be like. They independently, but simultaneously decided to shelf plans for buying durable consumer and investment goods and indeed anything that could be postponed, including expensive holidays and leisure travel. In previous episodes of declining world trade, there was no Lehman-like event to synchronise the wait-and-see stance on a global scale. The key points as concerns the trade and GDP collapse: †¢As the fear factor was propagating via the electronic press; the transmission was global and instantaneous. †¢The demand shock to GDP and the demand shock to trade occurred simultaneously. â€Å"Postponeable† sector production and trade were hit first and hardest. There are a number of indications that this is the right story. First, global trade in services did not, in general, collapse (see the chapter by Aditya Mattoo and Ingo Borchert). Interestingly, one of the few categories of services trade that did collapse was tourism – the ultimate postponeable. Second, macro economists’ investigations into the transmission mechanisms operating in this crisis show that none of the usual transmission vectors – trade in goods, international capital flows, and financial crisis contagion – were esponsible for the synchronisation of the global income drop (Rose and Spiegel 2009). Supply-side effects The Lehman-link â€Å"sudden financial arrest† froze global credit markets and spilled over on the specialized financial instruments that help grease the gears of international trade – letters of credit and the like. From the earliest days of the great trade collapse, analysts suspected that a lack of trade-credit financing was a contributing factor (Auboin 2009). As the chapter by Jesse Mora and William Powers argues, such supply-side shocks have been important in the past. Careful research on the 1997 Asian crisis (Amiti and Weinstein 2009) and historical bank crises (see the chapter by Leonardo Iacovone and Veronika Zavacka) provide convincing evidence that credit conditions can affect trade flows. The Mora and Powers chapter, however, finds that declines in global trade finance have not had a major impact on trade flows. While global credit markets in general did freeze up, trade finance declined only moderately in most cases. If anything, US cross-border bank financing bounced back earlier than bank financing from other sources. In short, trade financing had at most a moderate role in reducing global trade. Internationalised supply chains are a second potential source of supply shocks. One could imagine that a big drop in demand combined with deteriorating credit conditions might produce widespread bankruptcies among trading firms. Since the supply chain is a chain, bankruptcy of even a few links could suppress trade along the whole chain. The chapters by Peter Schott (on US data), by Lionel Fontagne and Guillaume Gaulier (on French data), and by Ruyhei Wakasugi (on Japanese data) present evidence that such disruptions did not occur this time. They do this by looking at very disaggregated data (firm-level data in the Fontagne-Gaulier chapter) and distinguishing between the so-called â€Å"intensive† and â€Å"extensive† margins of trade. These margins decompose changes in trade flows into changes in sales across existing trade relations (intensive) and changes in the number of such relations (extensive). If the supply-chain-disruption story were an important part of the great trade collapse, these authors should have found that the extensive margin was important. The authors, however, find that the great trade collapse has been primarily driven by the intensive margin – by changes in pre-existing trade relationships. Trade fell because firms sold less of products that they were already selling; there was very little destruction of trade relationships as would be the case if the extensive margin had been found to be important. This findings may be due to the notion of †hysteresis in trade† (Baldwin 1988), namely, that large and sunk market-entry costs imply that firms are reluctant to exit markets in the face of temporary shocks. Instead of exiting, they merely scale back their operations, waiting for better times. Protectionism is the final supply shock commonly broached as a cause of the great trade collapse. The chapter by Simon Evenett documents the rise in crisis-linked protectionist measures. While many measures have been put in place – on average, one G20 government has broken its no-protection pledge every other day since November 2008 – they do not yet cover a substantial fraction of world trade. Protection, in short, has not been a major cause of the trade collapse so far. Prospects The suddenness of the 2008 trade drop holds out the hope of an equally sudden recovery. If the fear-factor-demand-drop was the driver of the great trade collapse, a confidence-factor-demand-revival could equally drive a rapid restoration of trade to robust growth. If it was all a demand problem, after all, little long-lasting damage will have been done. See the chapter by Ruyhei Wakasugi on this. There are clear signs that trade is recovering, and it is absolutely clear that the drop has halted. Will the trade revival continue? No one can know the future path of global economic recovery – and this is the key to the trade recovery. It is useful nonetheless to think of the global economic crisis as consisting of two very different crises: a banking-and-balance-sheet crisis in the over-indebted advanced nations (especially the US and UK), on one hand, and an expectations-crisis in most of the rest of the world on the other hand. In the US, UK and some other G7 nations, the damage done by the bursting subprime bubble is still being felt. Their financial systems are still under severe strain. Bank lending is sluggish and corporate-debt issuances are problematic. Extraordinary direct interventions by central banks in the capital markets are underpinning the economic recovery. For these nations, the crisis – specifically the Subprime Crisis – has caused lasting damage. Banks, firms and individuals who over-leveraged during what they thought was the †great moderation† are now holding back on consumption and investment in an attempt to redress their balance sheets (Bean 2009). This could play itself out like the lost decade Japan experienced in the 1990s (Leijonhufvud 2009, Kobayashi 2008); also see the chapter by Michael Ferrantino and Aimee Larsen. For most nations in the world, however, this is not a financial crisis – it is a trade crisis. Many have reacted by instituting fiscal stimuli of historic proportions, but their banks and consumers are in relatively good shape, having avoided the overleveraging in the post tech-wreck period (2001-2007) that afflicted many of the G7 economies. The critical question is whether the damage to the G7’s financial systems will prevent a rapid recovery of demand and a restoration of confidence that will re-start the investment engine. In absence of a crystal ball, the chapter by Baldwin and Taglioni undertakes simple simulations that assume trade this time recovers at the pace it did in the past three global trade contractions (1974, 1982 and 2001). In those episodes, trade recovered to its pre-crisis path 2 to 4 quarters after the nadir. Assuming that 2009Q2 was the bottom of the great trade collapse – again an assumption that would require a crystal ball to confirm – this means trade would be back on track by mid 2010. Forecasts are never better than the assumptions on which they are built, so such calculations must be viewed as what-if scenarios rather than serious forecasts. Implications What does the great trade collapse mean for the world economy? The authors of this Ebook present a remarkable consensus on this. Three points are repeatedly stressed: †¢Global trade imbalances are a problem that needs to be tackled. One group of authors (see the chapters by Fred Bergsten, by Anne Krueger, and by Jeff Frieden) sees them as one the root causes of the Subprime Crisis. They worry that allowing them to continue is setting up the world for another global economic crisis. Fred Bergsten in particular argues that the US must get its federal budget deficit in order to avoid laying the carpet for the next crisis. Another group points to the combination of Asian trade surpluses and persistent high unemployment in the US and Europe as a source of protectionist pressures (see the chapters by Caroline Freund, by Simon Evenett, and by Richard Baldwin and Daria Taglioni). The chapter by O’Rourke notes that avoiding a protectionist backlash will require that the slump ends soon, and that severe exchange rate misalignments at a time of rising unemployment are avoided. †¢Governments should guard against compliancy in their vigil against protectionism. Most authors mention the point that while new protectionism to date has had a modest trade effect, things need not stay that way. The chapter by Simon Evenett is particularly clear on this point. There is much work to be done before economists fully understand the great trade collapse, but the chapters in this Ebook constitute a first draft of the consensus that will undoubtedly emerge from the pages of scientific journals in two or three years’ time. Footnotes 1 See Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) for evidence on how the shock was transmitted via international production networks. This is drawn from Baldwin and Taglioni (2009). 3 Jon Eaton, Sam Kortum, Brent Neiman and John Romalis make similar arguments with data from many nations in an unpublished manuscript dated October 2009. 4 See the excellent timeline of the crisis by the New York Fed. 5 Caballero (2009a, b) and Blanchard (2009). References Auboin, Marc (2009). â€Å"The challenges of trade financing†, VoxEU. o rg, 28 January 2009. Baldwin, Richard (1988). â€Å"Hysteresis in Import Prices: The Beachhead Effect†, American Economic Review, 78, 4, pp 773-785, 1988. Baldwin, Richard and Daria Taglioni (2009). â€Å"The illusion of improving global imbalances†, VoxEU. org, 14 November 2009. Bean, Charles (2009). â€Å"The Great Moderation, the Great Panic and the Great Contraction†, Schumpeter Lecture, European Economic Association, Barcelona, 25 August 2009. Blanchard, Olivier (2009). â€Å"(Nearly) nothing to fear but fear itself†, Economics Focus column, The Economist print edition, 29 January 2009. Caballero, Ricardo (2009a). â€Å"A global perspective on the great financial insurance run: Causes, consequences, and solutions (Part 2)†, VoxEU. rg, 23 January 2009. Caballero, Ricardo (2009b). â€Å"Sudden financial arrest†, VoxEU. org, 17 November 2009. Di Giovanni, Julian and Andrei Levchenko (2009). †International trade, vertical production linkages, and the transmission of shocks†, VoxEU. org, 11 November 2009. Freund, Caroline (2009a). â€Å"The Trade Response to Global Crises: Historical Evidence†, World Bank working paper. Gros, Daniel and Stefano Micossi (2009). â€Å"The beginning of the end game†¦Ã¢â‚¬ , VoxEU. org, 20 September 2008. Kobayashi, Keiichiro (2008). Financial crisis management: Lessons from Japan’s failure†, VoxEU. org, 27 October 2008. Leijonhufvud, Axel (2009). â€Å"No ordinary recession†, VoxEU. org, 13 February 2009. Rose, Andrew and Mark Spiegel (2009). â€Å"Searching for international contagion in the 2008 financial crisis†, VoxEU. org, 3 October 2009. Yi, Kei-Mu (2009), â€Å"The collapse of global trade: The role of vertical specialisation†, in Baldwin and Evenett (eds), The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis: Recommendations for the G20, a VoxEU publication. How to cite The Great Trade Collapse: What Caused It and What Does It Mean, Papers

Does CompStat Reduce Crime free essay sample

Compstat (short for computer statistics or comparative statistics) originated in the new york city police department (NYPD) in 1994 when william bratton was police commissioner. Compstat is a comprehensive, city-wide database that records all reported crimes or complaints, arrests, and summonses issued in each of the city’s 76 precincts. City officials had previously believed that crime could not be prevented by better information and analytical tools but instead by using more foot patrols in neighborhoods along with the concept of â€Å"community policing† in which efforts were made to strengthen the involvement of community groups. In contrast, bratton and rudy giuliani, then the mayor of new york city, believed that police could be more effective in reducing crime if operational decisions took place at the precinct level and if decision makers had better information. Precinct commanders were in a better position than police headquarters to understand the spesific needs of the communities they served and to direct the work of the 200 to 400 police officers they managed. We will write a custom essay sample on Does CompStat Reduce Crime? or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page Compstat gave precinct commanders more authority and responsibility, but also more accountability. At weekly meetings, representatives from each of the NYPD’s precincts, service areas, and transit districts are put on the â€Å"hot seat’ at police headquarters and required to provide a statistical summary of the week’s crime complaint, arrest and summons activity, as well as significant cases, crime patterns, and police activities. Commanders must explain what has been done to reduce crime in the districts under their command, and if crime has gone up, they must explain why. Commanders are held directly accountable for reducing crime in their area of command. In the past, they were evaluated primarily on the basis of their administrative skills, such as staying within budget and deploying resources efficiently. The data these commanders provide, including spesific times and locations of crimes and enforcement activities, are forwarded to the NYPD’s compstat unit where they are loaded into a city-wide database. The system analyzes the data and produces a weekly compstat report on crime complaint and arrest activity at the precinct, patrol borough, and city wide levels. The data are summarized by week, prior 30 days, and year-to-date for comparison with the previous year’s activity and for establishing trends. The compstat unit also issues weekly commander profile reports to measure the performance of precinct commanders. The weekly commander profile reports include information on the commander’s date of appointment, years in rank, education and specialized training, most recent performance evaluation rating, the units that person previously commanded, the amount of overtime generated by police under that commander, absence rates, community demographics, and civilian complaints. Using mapinfo geographic information system (GIS) software, the compstat data can be displayed on maps showing crime and arrest location, crime†hot spots†, and other relevant information. Comparative charts, tables, and graphs can also be projected simultaneously. These visual presentations help precinct commanders and members of the NYPD’s executive staff to quickly identify patterns and trends. Depending on the intelligence gleaned from the system, police chiefs and captains develop a targeted strategy for fighting crime, such as dispatching more foot patrols to high-crime neighborhoods, or isuuing warnings to the public when a particular model of vehicle is susceptible to theft. During bratton’s 27-month tenure, serious crime in new york dropped by 25% and homicides went down by 44%. Crime in new york city has dropped by 69% in the last 12 years. Skeptics do not believe that compstat was responsible for these results. They point to the decline in the number of young, poor men, an improved economy, programs that reduced welfare rolls while giving poor people access to better housing, increasing the size of the NYC police force, and giving precinct commanders more decision making responsibility and accountability. Nevertheless, bratton, convinced that compstat was the catalyst for new york’s drop in crime, imlemented the system in los angeles to further prove its worth. Since the introduction of compstat, combined violent and property crimes in los angeles dropped for six consecutive years. Yet the ratio of police officers to residents is only half that of new york and chicago. Compstat has also been adopted in philadelphia, austin, san fransisco, baltimore, and vancouver, british columbia. Skeptics point out that crime has fallen in all urban areas in the united states since 1990 regardless of whether the cities used compstat. In fact, a critical study of compstat by the police foundation found that compstat encouraged police to be only reactive rather than pro-active in fighting crime. Sending police to where crime has become a problem is, in other words, too late. Compstat encouraged what the police foundation called â€Å"whack-a-mole† theory of policing, similar to the game played in amusement parks. Rather than change police departments into nimble crime fighters, the foundation found that a database had been attached to traditional organizations, which themselves remained unchanged. Because of the emphasis placed on reducing crime and because of the newfound importance of crime statistics to officers careers, compstat has created pressure on some precinct commanders to manipulate crime statistics to produce favorable results. Officers must continue to improve their crime statistics, despite shrinking budgets and dwindling numbers of officers. A study conducted in 2009 via a questionnaire given to 1200 retired police captains and more senior officers concluded that nearly a third of respondents were aware of unethical manipulation of crime data. More than 100 survey respondents said that intense pressure to produce annual crime reductions led some supervisors and precinct commanders to manipulate crime statistics. For example, officers were known to check catalogs, ebay, and other sites for items similar to those reported stolen, looking for lower prices they could use to reduce the values of the stolen goods for record-keeping purposes. Grand larceny, a felony, is considered to be theft of goods valued at $1000 or more, whereas theft of goods valued at less than $1000 is only a misdemeanor. Using this method, precincts could reduce the number of felony thefts, considered an â€Å"index crime† and tracked by compstat. Surveys and anecdotal evidence also indicated a lack of receptiveness on the aprt of police in some areas, possibly motivated by a desire to reduce the number of crime incidents reported. Some survey respondents state the precinct commanders or aides dispatched to cime scenes sometimes tried to persuade victims not to file complaints or urged them to change their accounts of what happened in ways that could downgrade offenses to lesser crimes. Previous studies of compstat encountered an unwillingness by the NYPD to disclose their data reporting methods. A professor performing a study that ultimately praised compstat’s influence on crime on new york city was given full access to NYPD crime data, but the NYPD did not cooperate with the commission to combat police corruption (CCPC), an independent board that monitors police corruption. The commission sought subpoena power to demand the NYPD turn over its data and data collection procedures to uncover potential wrong doing by the police. Unfortunately, the commission was enied access to this data after strong police department opposition. On the other hand, versions of compstat have been adopted by hundreds of other police departments across the united states, and the compstat approach has been credited with improving police work in many cities, in new york city itself, much of the public believes that crime is down, and that the city has become a safer and more pleasan t place to live. Case study questions 1. what management, organization, and technology factors make compstat effective? 2. can police departments effectively combat crime without the compstat system? Is community policing incompatible with compstat? Explain your answer. 3. why would officers misreport certain data to compstat? What should be done about the misreporting of data? How can it be detected? Apakah CompStat mengurangi kejahatan? CompStat (singkatan statistik komputer atau statistik komparatif) berasal york city kepolisian baru (NYPD) pada tahun 1994 ketika william Bratton adalah komisaris polisi. CompStat adalah komprehensif, database yang kota-lebar yang mencatat semua kejahatan yang dilaporkan atau keluhan, penangkapan, dan surat panggilan yang dikeluarkan di masing-masing kota 76 daerah sekitar. Pejabat kota sebelumnya percaya bahwa kejahatan tidak dapat dicegah dengan informasi yang lebih baik dan alat-alat analisis melainkan dengan menggunakan patroli kaki lebih di lingkungan bersama dengan konsep community policing di mana upaya yang dilakukan untuk memperkuat keterlibatan kelompok masyarakat. Sebaliknya, Bratton dan Rudy Giuliani, maka walikota new york city, percaya bahwa polisi bisa lebih efektif dalam mengurangi kejahatan jika keputusan operasional berlangsung di tingkat polisi dan informasi jika pengambil keputusan lebih baik. Komandan polisi berada dalam posisi yang lebih baik daripada markas polisi untuk memahami kebutuhan spesifik dari masyarakat yang mereka layani dan untuk mengarahkan pekerjaan polisi 200 hingga 400 mereka berhasil. CompStat memberi komandan polisi lebih wewenang dan tanggung jawab, tetapi juga akuntabilitas. Pada pertemuan mingguan, perwakilan dari masing-masing daerah sekitar NYPD, area layanan, dan kabupaten angkutan diletakkan pada kursi panas di markas olisi dan diminta untuk memberikan ringkasan statistik pengaduan kejahatan minggu, penangkapan dan aktivitas panggilan, serta kasus-kasus penting, pola kejahatan, dan kegiatan polisi. Komandan harus menjelaskan apa yang telah dilakukan untuk mengurangi kejahatan di distrik-distrik di bawah komando mereka, dan jika kejahatan sudah naik, mereka harus menjelaskan mengapa. Komandan yang bertanggungjawab secara langsung terhadap mengurangi kejahatan di daerah mereka perintah. Di masa lalu, mereka dievaluasi terutama berdasarkan kemampua n administratif mereka, seperti tinggal di dalam anggaran dan menggunakan sumber daya secara efisien. Data ini memberikan komandan, termasuk waktu dan lokasi spesifik dari kejahatan dan kegiatan penegakan hukum, akan diteruskan ke unit CompStat NYPD mana mereka dimuat ke dalam database kota-lebar. Sistem ini menganalisis data dan menghasilkan laporan CompStat mingguan keluhan kejahatan dan kegiatan penangkapan di kantor polisi, patroli borough, dan tingkat luas kota. Data dirangkum dalam satu minggu, 30 hari sebelumnya, dan tahun-to-date untuk perbandingan dengan kegiatan tahun sebelumnya dan untuk menetapkan tren. Unit CompStat juga mengeluarkan laporan mingguan komandan profil untuk mengukur kinerja komandan polisi. Laporan mingguan Komandan profil mencakup informasi tentang tanggal komandan pengangkatan, tahun pangkat, pendidikan dan pelatihan khusus, terbaru kinerja Peringkat evaluasi, unit orang yang sebelumnya diperintahkan, jumlah lembur yang dihasilkan oleh polisi di bawah bahwa komandan, tingkat absensi, demografi masyarakat, dan keluhan sipil. Menggunakan MapInfo sistem informasi geografis (GIS) software, data CompStat dapat ditampilkan pada peta yang menunjukkan kejahatan dan lokasi penangkapan, kejahatan hot spot, dan informasi lain yang relevan. Perbandingan grafik, tabel, dan grafik juga dapat diproyeksikan secara bersamaan. Ini presentasi visual yang membantu komandan polisi dan anggota staf eksekutif NYPD untuk dengan cepat mengidentifikasi pola dan tren. Tergantung pada intelijen yang diperoleh dari sistem, kepala polisi dan kapten mengembangkan strategi ditargetkan untuk memerangi kejahatan, seperti pengiriman patroli kaki lebih ke lingkungan-kejahatan yang tinggi, atau isuuing peringatan kepada masyarakat saat model tertentu kendaraan rentan terhadap pencurian. Selama masa Bratton 27 bulan, kejahatan serius di new york turun sebesar 25% dan pembunuhan turun sebesar 44%. Kejahatan di new york city telah menurun sebesar 69% dalam 12 tahun terakhir. Skeptis tidak percaya bahwa CompStat bertanggung jawab atas hasil ini. Mereka menunjuk ke penurunan jumlah anak muda, laki-laki miskin, ekonomi membaik, program yang mengurangi gulungan kesejahteraan masyarakat miskin sambil memberikan akses ke perumahan yang lebih baik, meningkatkan ukuran dari kepolisian NYC, dan memberikan komandan polisi lebih pengambilan keputusan dan tanggung jawab akuntabilitas. Namun demikian, Bratton, yakin bahwa CompStat merupakan katalisator untuk penurunan new york dalam kejahatan, imlemented sistem di los angeles untuk lebih membuktikan nilainya. Sejak diperkenalkannya CompStat, dikombinasikan kejahatan kekerasan dan properti di los angeles turun selama enam tahun berturut-turut. Namun rasio polisi terhadap penduduk adalah hanya setengah dari new york dan Chicago. CompStat juga telah diadopsi di philadelphia, austin, san fransisco, baltimore, dan vancouver, british columbia. Skeptis menunjukkan bahwa kejahatan telah jatuh di semua wilayah perkotaan di negara bersatu sejak tahun 1990 terlepas dari a akah kota digunakan CompStat. Bahkan, sebuah studi kritis CompStat oleh yayasan polisi menemukan bahwa CompStat mendorong polisi untuk hanya reaktif daripada proaktif dalam memerangi kejahatan. Mengirim polisi untuk di mana kejahatan telah menjadi masalah adalah, dengan kata lain, terlambat. CompStat mendorong apa dasar polisi disebut mendera-a-mole teori ke polisian, mirip dengan permainan yang dimainkan di taman hiburan. Daripada perubahan departemen kepolisian menjadi pejuang kejahatan gesit, yayasan menemukan bahwa database telah melekat pada organisasi tradisional, yang sendiri tetap tidak berubah. Karena penekanan pada mengurangi kejahatan dan karena pentingnya baru ditemukan tindak kriminal kepada petugas karier, CompStat telah menciptakan tekanan pada beberapa komandan polisi untuk memanipulasi statistik kejahatan untuk menghasilkan hasil yang positif. Petugas harus terus meningkatkan statistik kejahatan mereka, meskipun menyusut anggaran dan berkurangnya jumlah petugas. Sebuah studi yang dilakukan pada tahun 2009 melalui kuesioner yang diberikan kepada 1200 kapten pensiunan polisi dan perwira yang lebih senior menyimpulkan bahwa hampir sepertiga dari responden menyadari manipulasi etis data kejahatan. Lebih dari 100 responden survei mengatakan bahwa tekanan kuat untuk menghasilkan pengurangan kejahatan tahunan menyebabkan beberapa supervisor dan komandan polisi untuk memanipulasi statistik kejahatan. Misalnya, petugas diketahui untuk memeriksa katalog, ebay, dan situs lainnya untuk item yang sama dengan yang dilaporkan dicuri, mencari harga yang lebih rendah bisa mereka gunakan untuk mengurangi nilai barang yang dicuri untuk tujuan menyimpan catatan. Pencurian berat, kejahatan besar, dianggap pencurian barang senilai $ 1000 atau lebih, sedangkan pencurian barang senilai kurang dari $ 1000 hanya kejahatan ringan. Dengan menggunakan metode ini, daerah sekitar dapat mengurangi jumlah pencurian kejahatan, dianggap sebagai kejahatan index dan dilacak oleh CompStat. Survei dan bukti anekdotal juga menunjukkan kurangnya keterbukaan di aprt polisi di beberapa daerah, mungkin didorong oleh keinginan untuk mengurangi jumlah insiden kejahatan yang dilaporkan. Beberapa responden survei menyatakan komandan polisi atau pembantu dikirim ke Cime adegan kadang-kadang mencoba membujuk korban untuk tidak mengajukan keluhan atau mendesak mereka untuk mengubah account mereka dari apa yang terjadi dengan cara yang bisa menurunkan tindak pidana kejahatan ringan. Studi sebelumnya CompStat mengalami keengganan oleh NYPD untuk mengungkapkan data mereka metode pelaporan. Seorang profesor melakukan penelitian yang pada akhirnya memuji pengaruh CompStat pada kejahatan di new york city diberi akses penuh ke data kejahatan NYPD, tetapi NYPD tidak bekerja sama dengan komisi untuk memerangi korupsi polisi (CCPC), suatu lembaga yang independen yang memantau korupsi polisi. Komisi mencari kekuatan subpoena untuk menuntut pergantian NYPD atas data dan prosedur pengumpulan data untuk mengungkap potensi perbuatan salah oleh polisi. Sayangnya, komisi itu ditolak akses ke data ini setelah oposisi kepolisian yang kuat. Di sisi lain, versi CompStat telah diadopsi oleh ratusan polisi departemen lain di seluruh negara bersatu, dan pendekatan CompStat telah dikreditkan dengan meningkatkan kerja polisi di banyak kota, di kota new york sendiri, banyak masyarakat percaya bahwa kejahatan turun, dan bahwa kota ini menjadi tempat yang lebih aman dan lebih menyenangkan untuk hidup. Pertanyaan studi kasus 1. faktor apa manajemen, organisasi, dan teknologi membuat CompStat efektif? 2. dapat departemen kepolisian secara efektif memerangi kejahatan tanpa sistem CompStat? Apakah perpolisian masyarakat sesuai dengan CompStat? Jelaskan jawaban Anda. 3. mengapa petugas salah melaporkan data-data tertentu ke CompStat? Apa yang harus dilakukan tentang misreporting data?